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Getting through the Door:
Threshold Procedural Considerations
in Right-to-Die Litigation
Sharon F. DiPaolo*
Technical application of the doctrines of mootness, ripeness and
standing, in the peculiar circumstances of right-to-die actions would
lead to dismissing many of them. Yet, such considerations are often
addressed summarily, if at all, 1 when courts wish to reach important
policy issues.
At the federal level, mootness, ripeness and standing have their
origins in the Article III "case or controversy" clause. It has been
interpreted to mean that an actual dispute is a prerequisite to a court's
jurisdiction. 2 In states that lack a constitutional "case or controversy"
clause, courts nevertheless impose such requirements as a matter of
3
common law.
Although the doctrines have common origin and are often treated
jointly, it is useful to separate them. At the most basic level, mootness
concerns the existence of justiciable disputes, ripeness seeks to ensure
that actions are not premature and standing, by far the most complex,
addresses whether a particular party is properly before the court. This
article will discuss each doctrine in order and argue that all should be
liberally construed if important right-to-die issues are to be resolved.
*

Ms. DiPaolo practices law with Doepken Keevican Weiss & Medved, P.C., in

Pittsburgh, PA. She received a B.S. from Duquesne University and J.D. from the
University of Pittsburgh. The views expressed here are those of the author and not of
Doepken Keevican Weiss & Medved.
1 E.g., Farnam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830, 847 n.10 (Wash. 1991)
(addressing mootness in a footnote); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 8 n.1 (Fla. 1990)
(addressing mootness in a footnote).
2 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990).
3 E.g., In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991) (Indiana constitution does
not have "case or controversy" requirement).
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Mootness
A case is moot if there is no longer a legal question to resolve or no

effective relief can be given. 4 Although the requirement of an
effective remedy is largely superceded by allowing declaratory

6
judgments, 5 the mootness doctrine seeks a justiciable controversy.
While courts generally dismiss cases if the issues are moot, most

jurisdictions 7 provide an exception to dismissal for mootness if issues
are of substantial public interest or are "capable of repetition, yet evade
review. " 8 Thus, in otherwise moot cases, courts may choose to
9
address the issues.
Actions involving the right to refuse treatment are often mooted on

appeal as when the patient dies from natural causes, a blood transfusion
has already been made pursuant to a lower court's order or treatment
has been discontinued pursuant to such an order. Also, cases can be
10
mooted if parties settle a dispute.

Because right-to-die actions typically fit exceptions to the mootness

doctrine, most courts decline to dismiss on that basis. 11 For example,
courts often find the issues raised of sufficient public importance to
warrant a hearing. 1 2 Also, even if an issue has been resolved for a
4

Id.

5 Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672,
167(-77 (1970).
6 "The chief purpose of mootness on appeal is to assure that the adversary system,
once set in operation, remains properly fueled." Id at 1688.
7 E.g., In re Angela C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990); Mercy Hosp. Inc. v.
Jackson, 510 A.2d 562 (Md. 1986) [hereinafter Mercy Hospital II]; In re Dorone,
502 A.2d 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Barding v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220

(Cal. App. 1984).
8 This oft-used phrase was coined in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. P.C.C., 219
U.S. 498 (1911).
9 Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37.
10 E.g., Clarkev. Clarke, 517 A.2d 816 (N.H. 1986) (case involving children with
AIDS challenging denial of admission to school dismissed for mootness after children
were admitted).
11 E.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re Storar, 420
N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858.
12 E.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d
286 (11. 1989); Dorone, 502 A.2d 1271; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (NJ.
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particular patient, medical facilities are apt to face it in the future when
it will again be mooted, even with expedited proceedings. 13 One court
noted that, at the time of oral argument, a medical facility had 40
14
patients who were either comatose or terminally ill.
Storar, consolidating two cases where guardians objected to
15
continued medical treatment, is typical of those that do not dismiss.
In both, the patients had already died, but the New York Court of
Appeals decided to hear the appeal. 16 Citing the need for judicial
restraint, the court explicitly limited its holding to the facts of those
cases. 17 Yet, the dissent urged that proper restraint required dismissal,
claiming that "[f]ar better would it be if we accepted the conclusion
18
nature has wrought and left the cases where they were."
In contrast, the Maryland Court of Appeals dismissed Hamilton,
19
an early case involving refusal of a blood transfusion, for mootness.
There, a patient who had been shot in the chest required an operation
20
and blood transfusion that the patient refused on religious grounds.
The hospital under a court order had already administered the
transfusion before appeal, but the patient argued that an alleged injury
21
to his constitutional rights remained for resolution.
The court disagreed. Because the transfusion had taken place and
the court order expired, it reasoned that the patient did not satisfy
mootness exceptions. 2 2 He did not allege a continuing personal injury
23
and could not demonstrate a likely recurrence:
1976), cert. denied sub. nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922. But see Dockery
v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
13 E.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 619 n.1.
14 John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), rev'd 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
15 In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64.
16 Id. at 66 n.1.
17 Id. at 67 n.2.
18 Id. at 79 (Fuchsberg J., dissenting).
19 Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 353 A.2d 634 (Md. 1976).
20 d at 636.
21 Id.
22 Ad. at 637-38.
6 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 59 [Winter 1995]

Whether an individual has the right to refuse a blood
transfusion necessarily turns upon facts existing at the
moment. The declaratory judgment process is therefore illfitted as a vehicle to declare the rights of parties in future
circumstances as yet unknown.
Hamilton was moot because the transfusion had been
administered, but the Maryland court seemed inadequately to consider
24
the extent to which the issue was capable of evading future review.
In contrast, the unique circumstances of Mercy Hospital do seem
to justify dismissal by the same court.2 5 There, a woman in premature
labor required a Cesarean section. The hospital advised that without a
transfusion the operation would pose a high risk of maternal mortality
(but virtually no fetal risk). Both the patient and her husband were
Jehovah's Witnesses and refused consent. Finding the risk unacceptable,
the hospital petitioned for guardianship. A judge denied its request
after a bedside hearing, and the operation took place without the
transfusion. After the mother and child survived, the hospital appealed.
An intermediate appellate court found the case moot but heard the
appeal, invoking exceptions. 2 6 The Court of Appeals reversed. Again
finding no likelihood of recurrence, it held that the circumstances of
27
the case were too unique to provide future guidance.
In Dockery, another early action, the Court of Appeals of
Tennessee dismissed for mootness where a patient died pending
appeal. 2 8 There, the patient's husband had sought authority to remove
a respirator from his semi-comatose wife.2 9 The court recognized
seven mootness exceptions, but, without examining them, dismissed
because issues raised were of a personal, not public interest. 30 Even
23
24
the
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.

"[A] transfusion ordered by a court in an emergency will always be given before
appellate process can be completed." Dorone, 502 A.2d at 1275.
Mercy Hospital II, 510 A.2d 562 (Md. 1986).
Mercy Hosp. Inc. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d (Md. App. 1985).
Mercy Hospital II, 510 A.2d, at 565.
Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 955.
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now, Dockery is on the border of cases allowing treatment to be
discontinued because the patient, not being fully comatose, 3 1 required
a respirator because of her pulmonary, not neurological, condition and
demonstrated "decortitate movement" "indicative of a higher level of
brain function than [normally seen] in comatose patients...." 32
Moot right-to-die actions should be heard when actions represent
not merely an academic debate, but a real controversy. That a patient
has died or a transfusion has been administered obviates the controversy
only at the most superficial level. Adjudication is the only cure for
potential violations of patients' constitutional rights. 3 3 In emergency
situations hospitals seek, and generally obtain, permission to continue
treatment because courts err on the side of life when faced with
emergency situations. If appellate courts regularly dismiss for mootness,
patients' rights will rarely be determined, and hospitals will have almost
unlimited authority for treatment decisions. Complex constitutional
issues should be determined after careful consideration and reflection at
34
the highest appellate level, not at bedside hearings.
Some courts take a narrow view of their role. Because each case is
35
unique, it is argued that hearing moot cases may be harmful:
Given the precedential strictures of stare decisis, to lay
down law, then, is needlessly to tie our own hands against
the time when we are confronted by an appeal we have to
decide.
Other courts prefer to have complex moral and public policy issues
resolved by legislatures. 3 6 However, Judge McAuliffe, dissenting in
31 Id. at 953.
32 Id. at 954.
33 Cf In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75 (Jones J., dissenting) (not a proper issue for
adjudication because, e.g., "[t]he lapse of time necessarily consumed in appellate
review before there can be a final judicial determination will almost always be
unacceptable and makes recourse to judicial proceedings impractical").
34 Because such cases involve complex moral and public policy issues, "we should
embrace the procedure that permits unhurried contemplation over that which
mandates a rush to judgment." Mercy Hospital II, 510 A.2d at 567 (McAuliffe J.,
dissenting).
35 Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 79 (Fuchsberg J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
36 Id.
6 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 59 [Winter 1995]

Mercy II, argued that: "Some areas of the law do not lend themselves
to resolution by broad legislation, but are best developed through a case
by case approach." 3 7 Also, even when legislatures have acted, courts
must interpret and apply the law. Thus, they have an unavoidable role
in developing the law.
Ripeness
While mootness involves being too late, ripeness involves being too
early. The ripeness doctrine seeks present controversies rather than
possible future ones. A major concern is that the controversy present a
38
factual record adequate to resolve legal issues meaningfully.
Right-to-die actions rarely suffer from being premature, and
ripeness arises infrequently in right-to-die litigation. Nevertheless, a
recent declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of
a Michigan statute prohibiting assisted suicides is a classic illustration of
39
circumstances where it may be raised.
In Michigan, declaratory judgment is appropriate if plaintiffs are
distinguishable from those with sheer intellectual interest, and issues are
susceptible to analysis without actual injury. 4 0 To avoid problems with
the first, ten divergent plaintiffs brought suit: seven health care
professionals, two terminally ill patients and a friend of one of the
patients.
That aside, the State argued that the issue was not ripe. It likened
the case to "a petition from potential criminals before they go forth in
the night." 4 1 Plaintiffs responded that declaratory judgment was
appropriate even if the controversy would only become real upon future
contingencies. 42 Siding with the latter, the court held that it would be
37 Mercy Hospital II, 510 A.2d at 567-68.
38 Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, supra note 5, at 1673.
39 Hobbins v. Attorney General, No. Civ.A.93-306-178 CZ, 1993 WL 276833
(Mich. Cir. Ct. May 20, 1993).
40 I.d at *3.
41 Id. at *2 (quoting Strager v. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, 10 Mich.
App. 166, 171 (1968)).
42 Id.
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unjust to withhold adjudication until the patient-plaintiffs would be
43
incapacitated.
Yet, the Washington Supreme Court invoked the ripeness doctrine
in dismissing an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
to determine the validity of a living will executed to cover terminal
illness in pregnancy. 4 4 Because plaintiff was presently neither
45
terminally ill nor pregnant, the court found no actual controversy.
Yet, a dissent argued that, had the events come to pass and been
46
mooted before appeal, the court would likely have heard the case:
[I]f, in its discretion, the court chooses to address the issues
on mooted facts, would that determination be based on any
less speculation than a determination under the
circumstances now before us?
A New York case concluded differently when, a year later, a 70year-old, suffering from emphysema and lung cancer, 4 7 sought a
ruling on the validity and effectiveness of her living will. Citing
estimates that 80,000 such documents had been executed in the State,
the court found the issues to be of great public importance. 4 8 The
court observed that "[r]esponsible parties who wish to comply with the
law in cases where the legal consequences of the contemplated action is
uncertain need not act at their peril." 4 9 Although the plaintiff had not
yet entered the hospital or been denied her choice of treatment, a
substantial controversy was found to exist, should contemplated events
50
take place.
Adjudicating such actions seems appropriate despite lack of a
present controversy. Once a controversy exists, a patient is unlikely to
43 Id.
44 DiNino v. State, 684 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1984).
45 Id. at 1300.
46 Id. at 1301.
47 Saunders v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).

48 In making its determination, the court also erroneously applied the exception to
the mootness doctrine to the ripeness issue, and held that the issue was 1) of great

public importance, 2) likely to recur, but 3) likely to evade review. Id. at 513.
49

Id at 512.

50 Id.
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be competent, and his or her rights should not be entirely dependent on
third party actions that are often in danger of dismissal for mootness as
addressed above or standing.
Standing
Generally
Of the three threshold issues, the standing doctrine is the most
complex and, for that reason, most thoroughly litigated. It seeks to
ensure that the plaintiff is a proper party and requires a litigant to
demonstrate a real stake in the litigation. 5 1 Also, to have standing, a
plaintiff must demonstrate a specific personal interest rather than one
52
shared generally by all members of a community.
Courts are generally reluctant to permit a person to assert another's
rights. 5 3 Sometimes, however, courts grant standing to plaintiffs
asserting rights on behalf of the real party in interest, provided that
certain conditions are met. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court
requires: 1) a substantial relationship between the parties, 2) that the real
party is unable to assert the claim on his own and 3) that the
constitutional right of the real party would be diluted if a third party
54
were not allowed to invoke it.
For example, in NAACP v. Alabama, 5 5 the State of Alabama
petitioned to have the names of NAACP members released. The
NAACP argued that its members had a constitutional right not to have
their identities revealed. The State responded that the organization had
56
no standing to argue the constitutional rights of its members.
Recognizing the general rule prohibiting the invocation of another's
51 Nye v. Marcus, 502 A.2d 869 (Conn. 1985).
52 Id.
53 Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 555 A.2d 812
(Pa. 1989).
54 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); accord, Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 685 (Ariz. 1987).
55 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 459-60.
56 Id. at 4 25.
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constitutional rights, the Court nevertheless granted the NAACP
standing. To hold otherwise would have substantially infringed the
rights of the individual members who, ironically, could not have
57
asserted their rights without disclosure.
Also, in a recent case of first impression, that Court addressed "next
friend" standing. 5 8 This theory, tracing back to 17th century England,
had been accepted by some federal courts. 5 9 It is invoked when a
litigant advances the cause of action of the real party in interest. 6 0 The
Court held that to invoke next friend standing, litigants must
demonstrate why the real party could not appear, true dedication to his
61
best interests and a significant relationship to that party.
Patient Standing in Right-to-Die Cases
When legally competent plaintiff-patients assert their own rights,
they generally have standing. 6 2 This is so even where, as in McKay v.
Bergstedt, there is no adverse party. 6 3 Bergstedt was a competent
quadriplegic who brought an action against the State of Nevada seeking
removal of the respirator which he needed to live. Although Bergstedt
fulfilled the requirement of asserting a personal interest, he could not
demonstrate adverseness because the State assumed only a "token
adversarial stance." 6 4 Because the State essentially agreed with
Bergstedt, he could demonstrate no well-grounded fear of invasion of
57 Id. at 459-60. As an aside, the Court also considered that the NAACP had an

economic stake in the outcome because of likelihood of diminished financial support
if the names had been revealed. Id.
58 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 161-66 (1990).
59 Next friend standing has typically been advanced on behalf of prisoners on the
basis of 1) incompetency or 2) physical inaccessibility. Id. at 162. Next friend
standing was successfully invoked in Groseclose v. Dutton where a death row inmate

was judged incompetent to waive post-conviction remedies. 549 F. Supp. 949 (M.D.

Tenn. 1984).
60 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. at 163.
61 Id. For example, a first cousin or a minister would not be sufficient to meet this
requirement. Id. at 164.
62 Hobbins v. Attorney General, 1993 WL 276833; McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d
617; Kirby v. Spivey, 307 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. App. 1983).
63 McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617.
64 Id. at 619-20.
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his right to refuse treatment. The court might have found that no
justiciable controversy existed, but it found standing because the action
raised issues "of such importance to the citizens of this State that an
appellate resolution [was] virtually compelled." 6 5 Because McKay was
the first Nevada case posing the right to refuse treatment, the court was
amply justified in hearing it.
Standing has also been granted to patients for whom death is not
imminent. 6 6 In a case discussed earlier, the Michigan Circuit Court
held that two terminally ill patients had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting assisted suicide. 67 In doing
so, it rejected the State's argument that these plaintiffs were "not
distinct in interest from the millions who consider the weighty issue of
assisted suicide" 6 8 and recognized a distinction between plaintiffs with
standing and persons for whom death is far less imminent.
Third Parties in Right-to-Die Cases
- Generally
In right-to-die cases, standing is usually in issue where the patient is
incompetent because of age or medical condition and a third party
seeks to invoke the patient's right, e.g., to remove life-sustaining
equipment or refuse a blood transfusion. 6 9 Courts are reluctant to
70
allow one person to speak for another in life-or-death decisions:
[W]e approach this case of first impression involving the
right to die with extreme caution and humility, mindful of
the overwhelming sense of responsibility that accompanies
the power to resolve what in this and similar future medical
treatment cases are all too often life-and-death issues.
65 Id. at 620.
66 Hobbins v. Attorney General, 1993 WL 276833.
67 Id.
68 Id. at *2-3.
69 But see, e.g., Hobbins v. Attorney General, 1993 WL 276833; McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617; Kirby v. Spivey, 307 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. App. 1983) (cases
where courts have addressed standing where the action is brought by a competent
patient). Cases involving actions brought by patients are discussed supra.
70 Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 679 (Ariz. 1987).
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An incompetent patient does not, however, lose his constitutional
rights. 7 1 Unless some third party can bring action, however, those
rights are devoid of meaning. 7 2 Comparing such persons with those
who are legally competent,'one court has asked: "What possible societal
policy objective is vindicated or furthered by treating the two groups of
terminally ill differently?" 7 3 Yet, there are important differences.
Actions on behalf of incompetent patients are most often brought
by guardians or close family members, e.g., spouses, parents and adult
children. 7 4 Actions are also brought by medical facilities, prisons and
75
state institutions that oppose a family's treatment decision.
As noted above, a major purpose of the standing requirement is to
ensure a justiciable "case or controversy." 7 6 Where treatment decisions
are contended, a controversy exists, regardless of who brings the action
That an action is not brought by the real party does not negate the
existence of a controversy. Where the family members and treating
physician agree, decisions are usually made privately. Therefore, any
case is likely to pose a serious dispute with a real possibility of liability.
Where a party cannot meet technical tests for standing, the interests
of justice may nevertheless dictate that a court hear the case. 7 7 In this
71 Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
72 Id. at 1347 ("IT]o deny the exercise because the patient is unconscious would be
to deny the right.")
73 Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 542-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
74 Grace Plaza v. Elbaum, 1993 WL 406654 (N.Y. Oct. 14, 1993) (husband); In re
O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517 (N.Y. 1988) (adult children); Weber v. Stony Brook
Hosp., 456 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983) (guardian);
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (father).
75 Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. 1982) (medical facility);
Commission of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979) (prison);
Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
76 Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 37.
77 In contrast, federal courts under the constraint of the "case or controversy" clause
are less likely to disregard the standing requirement:
[T]he requirement of an Article III 'case or controversy" is not merely a
traditional "rule of practice," but rather is imposed directly by the
Constitution. It is not for this Court to employ untethered notions of
what might be good public policy to expand our jurisdiction in
appealing a case.
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. at 161. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445
n.5 (1972) (Supreme Court relaxed third party standing requirements where denying
6 Risl Health, Safety & Environment 59 [Winter 1995)

regard, one court noted New Jersey's practice of "sweepingly rejecting
procedural frustrations in favor of 'just and expeditious determinations
78
on the ultimate merits'."
Yet, when cases are to be heard, the court must ensure the best
possible litigants. 79 For example, one can imagine a situation in which
a disinterested, but unrelated third person might try to invoke a
patient's rights. 80 Requiring a showing of a substantial relationship
between the litigant and the patient ensures that actions are not
initiated by virtual strangers.
" Family Members
Third party actions by close family members asserting the right to
refuse treatment are often permitted because they are most able to
know what an incompetent patient would have wanted. However,
caring for a loved one in a chronic vegetative state is emotionally taxing,
and medical treatment can be prohibitively expensive. Thus, family
81
interests may conflict with those of an incompetent patient. Such
concerns exist in many third party actions but seem insufficient to
categorically deny standing. Rather, courts should make a preliminary
case-by-case determination.
In Quinlan, the earliest right-to-die decision, a father sought
82
guardianship of his daughter who was in a persistent vegetative state.
Specifically, he sought to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the father had standing to raise
both his daughter's constitutional rights and his parental rights.
Regarding the daughter's rights, the court simply stated that a parent
had standing to invoke the constitutional rights of an incompetent
standing would have "intolerable, inhibitory effect on freedom of speech").

78 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (quoting Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v.
Realty Equities Corp., 275 A.2d 433 (NJ. 1971)).
79 Nye v. Marcus, 502 A.2d 869 (Conn. 1985).
80 E.g., Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1186-87 (N.Y. 1983)

(where unrelated individual sought to enjoin parents from following conservative
treatment plan for their handicapped infant).
81 See, e.g., Grace Plaza v. Elbaum, 1993 WL 406654 (N.Y. Oct. 14, 1993).
82 Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
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child. 8 3 However, it seems important that the court also found that his
"strength of purpose and character" outweighed his natural grief and
sorrow. 8 4 Moreover, the court found that the father had standing to
assert parental rights. He was not simply an "interloper" and asserted a
real and adverse interest. Also, questions before the court were of
"surpassing importance."
Parents often bring actions on behalf of children adjudged
incompetent on the basis of minority status or physical or mental
conditions. 8 5 Most courts apply the general rule that parents can assert
the constitutional rights of their children. 8 6 While most courts do not
examine the rationale behind this rule, it is consistent with general
requirements for third party standing. First, few relationships are more
significant. Second, age or incompetence prevent the child from
personally asserting the claim. Finally, the child's constitutional right
would be void unless the parent had the authority to invoke it.
,That case may be contrasted with Dorone.8 7 There a twentytwo-year-old Jehovah's Witness, unconscious as a result of an
automobile accident, required a blood transfusion and had previously
signed a medical alert card refusing blood transfusions. 8 8 The parents
challenged an order appointing a hospital administrator as the patient's
temporary guardian, but the court denied standing.
Dorone is difficult to understand. The right of parents to
challenge a guardianship appointment regarding their child implicates
their own rights as well as those of the incompetent child. A more
proper resolution seems require that the court grant standing and then
determine parental fitness to be guardians.
83 Id. at 661.
84 Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
85 E.g., In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. App. 1992) (parents' action on
behalf of 10-year-old daughter in persistent vegetative state); Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
86 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); In re Baby "K", No. Civ. A.93104-A, 1993 WL 343557,

- F. Supp. -

(E.D. Va. 1993); Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d

32; In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633; In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286; Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647. But see, Dorone, 502 A.2d 1271.
87 Dorone, 502 A.2d 1271.
88 Id at 1273.
6 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 59 [Winter 1995]

- Actions by guardians
There are several types of guardians with the degree of medical
decisionmaking authority afforded to each type differing. A limited
guardian for medical decision making is treated as the patient's
surrogate and has complete authority to decline treatment on the
patient's behalf.8 9 A plenary guardian has authority to make all
decisions, including medical decisions, on behalf of another who is
incapable of administering their own affairs. 9 0 A plenary guardian's
concurrence should be sought if treatment decisions are made by the
family and physician. 9 1 Most common are general guardians whose
authority derives from a state guardianship statute. If the statute is not
clear, a court must examine the statute in order to determine if a
general guardian has medical decisionmaking authority.92 A guardian
ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the court for the sole
purpose of representing the patient's best interests in the pending
litigation. 93 While a guardian ad litem might advocate for or against
94
a decision, it has no authority to decide or to enforce a treatment.
Some, but not all, guardians with medical decisionmaking authority
will meet requirements for standing. Although rarely acknowledged,
empirically courts grant standing to a guardian only if his or her
proposed decision is not at odds with the wishes of the patient's
family. 95 Under the three-prong third party standing analysis, reliance
on wishes of family members is appropriate in adjudicating a guardian's
standing. The guardian will meet the first two prongs of the test, 96 but
89 Alan Meisel, The Right to Die 181 (1989).
90 Id. at 178-79.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 179.
93 Black's Law Dictionary 706 (6th ed. 1990).
94 In reGreenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990).
95 Id; Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32; and Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674.
96 First, because guardians are only appointed where the patient is incompetent, it is
clear that the patient would be unable to assert the claim personally. Further, the
guardian demonstrates a substantial relationship to the patient by virtue of their court
appointment and absolute duty to act in the patient's best interest.
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where concerned family members are available, the guardian will fail
the third prong - that incompetent's rights would otherwise be
diluted. Where immediate family members make their wishes known
and invoke the incompetent's rights, granting standing to an unrelated
guardian is unnecessary unless family members permit personal interests
to interfere with the patient's interests.
In Greenspan,97 a general guardian for a 76-year-old nursing
home patient in a chronic vegetative state petitioned for leave to order
the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. 9 8 The patient's wife,
adult children and rabbi concurred in the decision, testifying that the
patient had made statements to the effect that "life was not worth
living without the capacity to enjoy it."99 The trial court held that the
general guardian lacked standing. 10 0 On appeal, the guardian argued
that he had standing under the Illinois Probate Act. The Supreme
Court of Illinois agreed. Notably, in reaching its decision, the court
assumed that the guardian sought to exercise not the right of the
101
patient, but his own right under the Act.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona found that a general
guardian had standing under the state guardianship statute to assert the
patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 102 Here, although the
patient's immediate family did not take an active role in the decision
they had agreed to abide by a "do not resuscitate" order and were
aware of the guardianship proceedings. 103 In granting standing, the
court observed that "[t]o hold otherwise would... reduce the guardian's
control over medical treatment to little more than a mechanistic
10 4
rubberstamp for the wishes of the medical treatment team."
97 In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (IUI. 1990).

98 Id. at 1195-96.
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1195.
Id.at 1199-1200.
Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674.

Id.

104 Id.
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However, standing was denied to a guardian ad litem in
Lawrance, where the guardian opposed a family's decision. 105 The
patient was a forty-two-year-old woman who had undergone two
craniotomies. The first caused permanent brain damage, and the
second placed her in a permanent vegetative state. Her parents, four
siblings and treating physicians unanimously agreed to withdraw
nutrition and hydration. 106 The parents petitioned for, and were
granted, this authority. 10 7 However, after the trial court decision, a
108
group representing disabled persons petitioned for guardianship.
The trial court appointed the group as her temporary limited guardian
with authority to seek a stay or appellate review. On appeal, however,
the Indiana Supreme Court denied the guardian standing, holding that
courts are available to guardians only where there is no unanimity
10 9
among the patient's family and the treating physicians.
Likewise, in Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, the New York Court
of Appeals denied standing to an unrelated guardian who sought
judicial authorization to override the treatment decision of an infant's
parents.' 10 The infant, Baby Jane Doe, was born with spina bifida and
other serious complicating disorders. 11 1 After consulting with religious
counselors, a social worker, neurological experts and nurses, the parents
112
decided to avoid surgery, opting instead for conservative treatment.
The guardian had no direct interest or relationship to the child and had
failed to follow proper procedures. Under New York's Family Court
Act, parents were found to have the primary responsibility to choose
113
medical care for their child:
105 Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32.
106

Id. at 35.

107 Id.
108 Id at 36.
109 Id. at 4 4.
110 456 N.E.2d at 1186-87 (N.Y. 1983).
III Id. at 1187.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1188.
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[T]he proposition [the guardian] espouses would be to
recognize the right of any person,... to institute judicial
proceedings which would catapult him into the very heart of
the family circle, there to challenge the most private and
most precious responsibility vested in the parents for the
care and nurture of their children....

. Actions by health care professionals and medical facilities
Health care facilities that seek standing in right-to-die actions do
not generally assert patient's interests, but, rather, their own including minimizing liability, adhering to principles of medical ethics
and reducing emotional strain.
If there is a real threat of liability, standing is granted. 1 1 4 Where
little or no potential exists, hospitals have an insufficient interest in
treatment decisions to assert standing. For example, a hospital does not
have standing to compel a blood transfusion simply because a patient
has standing to refuse. 1 15 Further, although the medical profession may
have a moral obligation to preserve life, its right is not legallyprotected. 116 Therefore, where exposure to liability is minimal as when
the family and physician agree on treatment, a facility "generally would
lack sufficient interest to warrant any court relief." 1 17 Treatment can be
expensive, offering potential incentive to continue. Thus, granting
standing to hospitals that lack a real threat of liability may encourage
unnecessary actions, contrary to a policy of judicial economy.
Also with health professionals, potential liability exposure is likely to
be key. In the recent Hobbins decision, only two- of seven professionals
challenging Michigan's newly-enacted statute prohibiting assisted
suicide were granted standing. 1 1 8 Five doctors argued that the threat of
114 Hobbins v. Attorney General, 1993 WL 276833; In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 69
n.3.
115 In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (Burger, J., dissenting).
116 Id.
117 Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 69 n.3.; accord President of Georgetown College, 331

F.2d at 1015 (Burger J., dissenting) (hospital's argument of potential liability
insupportable where husband and wife offered to sign waiver of liability).
118 Hobbins v. Attorney General, 1993 WL 276833.
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prosecution would have a "chilling effect" on their dispensation of pain
medications, but the court found their interests too remote. 119 Yet,
standing was granted to a psychiatrist who was potentially liable for
prescribing medications that could hasten death, as well as to a
120
pharmacist concerned about filling prescriptions in lethal quantities.
- Actions by criminal defendants
Standing of criminal defendants trying to continue treatment to
avoid murder charges has been uniformly rejected. 12 1 Such persons
"may never legally overrule" others' treatment decisions. 12 2 A
Washington case is typical. 123 There, Yates had allegedly kidnapped
three teenage girls; strangled, stabbed and shot them all; and left them
for dead. 124 All survived, but two were severely injured. After one,
Bunnie Brown, was diagnosed as permanently vegetative, it was decided
to remove her feeding tubes. 12 5 Police had waited with regard to
12 6
Brown, but later charged aggravated murder in the first degree.
Meanwhile, Yates had unsuccessfully sought to enjoin removal of
her life-support system. 12 7 Although Brown had already died, the court
affirmed his lack of standing on appeal, noting that to hold otherwise
128

would be "unconscionable."

Yates is a legal stranger to the decision of whether
Brown's life support should have been removed. After
confessing to the acts that caused her to require the support
devices, he then sought to minimize his own jeopardy by
keeping her on life support.
119 Id.at *3.

120 Id.
121 See, e.g., State v. Yates, 824 P.2d 519 (Wash. App. 1992) and Inre J.N., 406
A.2d 1275 (D.C. 1979).
122 In reJ.N., 406 A.2d at 1282 (purse snatcher who hit 83-year-old woman on the
head sought to maintain life-support needed for the injuries suffered in the attack).
123 Yates, 824 P.2d 519.
124 Id.
at 520-21.
125 Id.
at 521.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id at 522.
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Conclusion
Decisions to discontinue life-support do not require court approval.
12 9
On the contrary, courts generally discourage judicial intervention:
[T]here are myriads of problems and troubles which judges
are powerless to solve and this is as it should be. Some
matters of essentially private concern and others of
enormous public concern are beyond the reach of judges.
Also, in Quinlan, for example, intervention was said to place the court
in an inappropriate advisory role and encroach upon medical autonomy
13 0
as well as to be potentially cumbersome for courts.
Yet, courts should hear two types of actions. In cases of first
impression, they should guide those who fear criminal or civil liability.
Also, they should hear cases where conflicts exist within a family, 1 3 1 or
with a physician, regarding appropriate treatment 13 2 because, at such
13 3
times, "[t]he failure to go to court... is an invitation to liability."
-

Judges must avoid resolving important novel issues or true
controversies merely because of the peculiar circumstances involved in
right-to-die litigation. Nor should they be too quick to defer to
legislators: Legislative machinery moves slowly and, in any event, does
not have the power to resolve constitutional questions. Even where
legislatures have authority, it is unjust to make terminally ill patients or
their families wait for the resolution of life-or-death issues. Barring
procedural obstacles, as rights and responsibilities become better
defined, more decisions can be made in private, by patients, families
and physicians - and fewer by courts.

129 In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1015 (Burger J.,
dissenting) .
130 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 699.
131 E.g., In re Baby "K", 1993 WL 343557, (granting standing to mother of
anencephalic baby who insisted on continuing treatment, contrary to the wishes of
biological father, hospital, and guardian ad litem).
132 Meisel, supra note 89, at 162.
133 Id. at 164.
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